University of Cambridge > > Optimization and Incentives Seminar > Analytic Results on a Decentralized Combinatorial Auction

Analytic Results on a Decentralized Combinatorial Auction

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Abstract: Frank Kelly and the speaker proposed a decentralized combinatorial auction called PAUSE that allows for all possible combinatorial bids, and yet is computationally tractable for the auctioneer and transparent to the bidders. We examine this auction from an analytic viewpoint. Specifically, we derive a number of results related to the revenue generated, including showing that PAUSE generates at least as much revenue as the VCG mechanism when there are only two bidders, and providing lower bounds on the revenue under various scenarios with an arbitrary number of bidders. We also propose a modification of the auction that has the potential to increase revenue while retaining the auction’s most desirable features. (Joint work with S. Damla Ahipasaoglu and James B. Orlin).

This talk is part of the Optimization and Incentives Seminar series.

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