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Belief and statistical evidence

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Hume’s argument concerning miracles and the well-known gate-crasher paradox are both cases where people seem reluctant to believe something, or courts seem reluctant to convict someone, despite extremely strong statistical evidence that the thing is true or that the person is guilty. I propose to account for this in terms of some simple ideas from Signal Detection Theory. The upshot is that Hume is still right, but the courts may sometimes be wrong.

This talk is part of the CamPoS (Cambridge Philosophy of Science) seminar series.

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