Robust and Frugal Mechanisms for Hiring a Team

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• Mahyar Salek (MSR Cambridge)
• Monday 22 October 2012, 15:00-16:00
• MR12, Centre for Mathematical Sciences, Wilberforce Road, Cambridge.

If you have a question about this talk, please contact Felix Fischer.

Project sourcing is becoming increasingly difficult due to the growing volume and complexity of modern projects. Projects often require a team of agents with diverse skills. In addition, it is sometimes too expensive to evaluate the performance of an agent (Compare the cost of verifying an annotation for a photo to annotating it).

We consider two approaches for hiring a team: auctions and crowdsourcing. For auctions, we show how to design truthful and frugal auctions for a broad class of set systems. Our mechanism is built on the spectral properties of a graph reduced from the set system. For crowdsourcing, we study truthful peer prediction mechanism.

This talk is part of the Optimization and Incentives Seminar series.

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