University of Cambridge > > Computer Laboratory Systems Research Group Seminar > Eliminating Network Protocol Vulnerabilities Through Abstraction and Systems Language Design

Eliminating Network Protocol Vulnerabilities Through Abstraction and Systems Language Design

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Incorrect implementations of network protocol message specifications affect the stability, security, and cost of network system development. Most implementation defects fall into one of three categories of well defined message constraints. However, the general process of constructing network protocol stacks and systems does not capture these categorical constraints. We introduce a systems programming language with new abstractions that capture these constraints. Safe and efficient implementations of standard message handling operations are synthesized by our compiler, and whole-program analysis is used to ensure constraints are never violated. We present language examples using the OpenFlow protocol.

Bio: Jasson Casey is a PhD student in the Electrical and Computer Engineering department at Texas A&M University and a research affiliate with the Center for Secure Information Systems at George Mason University. His research areas include network protocol and system design, programming language and compiler design, and computer architecture of network systems. Jasson has over 15 years experience in the network communications industry where he held engineering and management positions in both technology startups and S&P 500 public companies. Some of his activities during this time include the design and deployment the first carrier grade VoIP firewalls in 2002, and one of the largest outdoor mobile WiFi network (>25,000 radios) in 2008.

This talk is part of the Computer Laboratory Systems Research Group Seminar series.

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