University of Cambridge > > Computer Laboratory Systems Research Group Seminar > Towards Efficient Traffic-analysis Resistant Anonymity Networks

Towards Efficient Traffic-analysis Resistant Anonymity Networks

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If you have a question about this talk, please contact Eiko Yoneki.

Joint seminar with Security Group Seminar.

As more and more of our lives are conducted over the Internet, the need for anonymity, including network anonymity, is growing. However, existing network anonymity systems tend to sacrifice one of low latency, high bandwidth, or resistance to traffic-analysis in favor of the remaining two properties. For example, Onion routing schemes like Tor deliver low latency and high bandwidth, but are not designed to withstand traffic analysis, making them vulnerable to state-sponsored attackers. In this talk, I will present the design and evaluation of Aqua, a high-bandwidth anonymity system for P2P file sharing that provides modest latency and is resistant to traffic analysis.

Bio: Stevens Le Blond holds a M.Sc. from Vrije Universiteit, Amsterdam and a Ph.D. from INRIA , France. Stevens seeks to tackle high-risk / high-impact research problems in the broad areas of computer systems and networks. After having enjoyed sun bathing in Nice, Stevens is now experiencing actual bathing in Germany where he’s a postdoc in Paul Francis’ group at the Max Planck Institute for Software Systems. Stevens’ Ph.D. work has been featured in the New York times, NPR , and the Wall Street Journal. His research has been published in leading conferences such as SIGCOMM and IMC .

This talk is part of the Computer Laboratory Systems Research Group Seminar series.

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