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University of Cambridge > Talks.cam > Computer Laboratory Security Seminar > VerLoc: Verifiable Localization in Decentralized Systems
VerLoc: Verifiable Localization in Decentralized SystemsAdd to your list(s) Download to your calendar using vCal
If you have a question about this talk, please contact Kieron Ivy Turk. We tackle the challenge of reliably determining the geolocation of nodes in decentralized networks, considering adversarial settings and without depending on any trusted landmarks. In particular, we consider active adversaries that control a subset of nodes, announce false locations and strategically manipulate measurements. To address this problem we propose, implement and evaluate VerLoc, a system that allows verifying the claimed geo-locations of network nodes in a fully decentralized manner. VerLoc securely schedules roundtrip time (RTT) measurements between randomly chosen pairs of nodes. Trilateration is then applied to the set of measurements to verify claimed geo-locations. We evaluate VerLoc both with simulations and in the wild using a prototype implementation integrated in the Nym network (currently run by thousands of nodes). We find that VerLoc can localize nodes in the wild with a median error of 60 km, and that in attack simulations it is capable of detecting and filtering out adversarial timing manipulations for network setups with up to 20 % malicious nodes. This talk is part of the Computer Laboratory Security Seminar series. This talk is included in these lists:
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