A Sybil-proof one-hop DHT

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• Chris Lesniewski-Laas, MIT
• Thursday 27 March 2008, 16:00-16:30
• Computer Laboratory, William Gates Building, Room FW11.

If you have a question about this talk, please contact Andrew Lewis.

Decentralized systems, such as structured overlays, are subject to the Sybil attack, in which an adversary creates many false identities to increase its influence. This paper describes a one-hop distributed hash table which uses the social links between users to strongly resist the Sybil attack. The social network is assumed to be fast mixing, meaning that a random walk in the honest part of the network quickly approaches the uniform distribution. As in the related SybilLimit system, with a social network of n honest nodes and m honest edges, the protocol can tolerate up to o(n/log n) attack edges (social links from honest nodes to compromised nodes). The routing tables contain O(√m log m) entries per node and are constructed efficiently by a distributed protocol. This is the first sublinear solution to this problem. Preliminary simulation results are presented to demonstrate the approach’s effectiveness.

This talk is part of the Computer Laboratory Security Group meeting presentations series.

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