What can scientific realists think about scientific method(s)?
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First, I will identify a methodological thesis associated with
scientific realism. This has different variants, but each concerns the
reliability of scientific methods in connection with acquiring, or
approaching, truth or approximate truth. Second, I will show how this
thesis bears on what scientists should do when considering new theories
that significantly contradict older theories. Third, I will explore how
vulnerable scientific realism is to a reductio ad absurdum as a result.
Finally, I will consider which variants of the methodological thesis are
the most defensible in light of the earlier findings.
This talk is part of the CamPoS (Cambridge Philosophy of Science) seminar series.
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