University of Cambridge > > Department of History and Philosophy of Science > The emergence of bargaining inequity

The emergence of bargaining inequity

Add to your list(s) Download to your calendar using vCal

If you have a question about this talk, please contact Marta Halina.

If you ask someone to divide a pie between two imaginary recipients, they are likely to recommend a 50/50 split. Philosophers like Brian Skyrms and Jason Alexander have employed evolutionary game theory to explain why such ‘fair’ divisions are almost universally observed in experimental work, and to explain the ubiquity of stated norms of fairness in human societies. When one moves away from an idealized lab setting, however, resource division is rarely governed by these stated norms. In particular, distributive injustice seems to be the rule for many interactions between those in different social categories – men and women, for example, or white people and people of colour. In this talk, I use evolutionary game theory to show why unequal patterns of division often emerge between social groups, and to clarify the conditions under which previous results in philosophy on the emergence of fairness should be expected to hold.

This talk is part of the Department of History and Philosophy of Science series.

Tell a friend about this talk:

This talk is included in these lists:

Note that ex-directory lists are not shown.


© 2006-2024, University of Cambridge. Contact Us | Help and Documentation | Privacy and Publicity