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Behavioral Decision Making in Interdependent Security Games

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Abstract: I will present my work on a class of interdependent security games with decision makers who perceive security risks (probabilities of successful attack) in a nonlinear fashion, overweighting small probabilities and underweighting large probabilities, as observed in behavioral experiments. Our results show significant deviations in the equilibrium security investments and risk profiles compared to risk neutral decision makers. The paper is available here:

This talk is part of the Computer Laboratory Security Group meeting presentations series.

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