University of Cambridge > > CamPoS (Cambridge Philosophy of Science) seminar > Inference to the best explanation and paradigms

Inference to the best explanation and paradigms

Add to your list(s) Download to your calendar using vCal

If you have a question about this talk, please contact Christopher Clarke.

Peter Lipton raises several important problems for his model of Inference to the Best Explanation: Voltaire’s objection, Hungerford’s objection, and the problem of Underconsideration. In this paper I argue that Lipton’s own solutions don’t fully answer those problems, but that an understanding of the cognitive processes of science derived from Kuhn’s account of exemplars and paradigm-driven science can do so.

This talk is part of the CamPoS (Cambridge Philosophy of Science) seminar series.

Tell a friend about this talk:

This talk is included in these lists:

Note that ex-directory lists are not shown.


© 2006-2021, University of Cambridge. Contact Us | Help and Documentation | Privacy and Publicity