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Side-channel security requirements for electronic voting equipment

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A simple public demonstration of a Tempest vulnerability of a voting machine in 2006 eventually ended the use of electronic voting equipment in ballot stations in the Netherlands. This event set a particularly high bar for the side-channel security requirements of future generations of such equipment, due to the low information rate that needs to be protected in a voting system. This talk looks back at some of the security specifications and implementation guidance that were subsequently proposed, and some attack techniques that are of particular concern.

This talk is part of the Computer Laboratory Security Group meeting presentations series.

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