The philosophical significance of the Representational Theory of Measurement: RTM as semantic foundations

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• Jo Wolff (University of Edinburgh)
• Thursday 27 October 2022, 15:30-17:00
• Seminar Room 2, Department of History and Philosophy of Science.

If you have a question about this talk, please contact Jacob Stegenga.

The Representational Theory of Measurement (RTM), especially the canonical three volume Foundations of Measurement by Krantz et al., is a landmark accomplishment in our understanding of measurement. Despite this, it has been far from easy to pinpoint what exactly we can learn about measurement from RTM , and who the target audience for RTM ’s formal results should be. In what sense does RTM provide foundations of measurement, and what is the philosophical significance of such foundations? I argue that RTM provides semantic foundations of measurement and that their philosophical significance lies in a shift towards structural representation. This argument concedes much ground to recent critics of RTM as epistemic foundations, but defends RTM as a foundational theory of measurement, nonetheless.

This talk is part of the Departmental Seminars in History and Philosophy of Science series.

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