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Reward Sharing for Mixnets

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If you have a question about this talk, please contact Kieron Ivy Turk.

In this talk I will present a reward sharing scheme for incentivized network privacy infrastructures such as the Nym mixnet. The talk is based on a paper co-authored with Aggelos Kiayias and Harry Halpin that will soon appear in the MIT Cryptoeconomic Systems (CES) journal. The reward scheme uses a bootstrapping reserve and a bandwidth pricing mechanism to fund a decentralized, economically sustainable mixnet that can scale, as increased usage translates into fees that allow the mixnet to grow to meet demand. The scheme periodically selects mix nodes to mix packets proportionally to their reputation, which signals the confidence of stakeholders in a node’s reliability and performance. Selected mix nodes are then rewarded proportionally to their reputation and performance, and share their rewards with the stakeholders supporting them. We prove the properties of the scheme with a game-theoretic analysis, showing that the equilibria promote decentralization and mixnet performance. We further evaluate the scheme empirically via simulations that consider non-ideal conditions and show that the mixnet can be viable under realistic assumptions.

This talk is part of the Computer Laboratory Security Seminar series.

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