University of Cambridge > > Computer Laboratory Security Seminar > Towards Provable Physical Safety Against False Actuation Attacks in CPS

Towards Provable Physical Safety Against False Actuation Attacks in CPS

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  • UserAlvaro Cardenas, University of California, Santa Cruz
  • ClockTuesday 26 January 2021, 16:00-17:00
  • HouseWebinar.

If you have a question about this talk, please contact Jack Hughes.

The vulnerability of cyber-physical systems (CPS) is a growing area of concern, and in the past decade, researchers have proposed a variety of security defenses for these systems. Most of these proposals are heuristic in nature, and while they increase the protection of their target, the security guarantees they provide are unclear. In this talk we discuss two different approaches for modeling the security guarantees of a cyber-physical system against arbitrary false command attacks. The first part of the talk discusses the idea of providing physical protections by saturating actuators, and the second part of the talk discusses how to use barrier certificates to prove safety of a real-world system. Our work is an effort to move forward CPS security research towards precise definitions, precise claims, and provable security.

RECORDING : Please note, this event may be recorded and may be available after the event for an indeterminate period under a CC BY -NC-ND license. Audience members should bear this in mind before joining the webinar or asking questions.

This talk is part of the Computer Laboratory Security Seminar series.

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