University of Cambridge > > Microsoft Research Cambridge, public talks > Mechanism design: dealing with interdependencies among agents.

Mechanism design: dealing with interdependencies among agents.

Add to your list(s) Download to your calendar using vCal

If you have a question about this talk, please contact Microsoft Research Cambridge Talks Admins.

This event may be recorded and made available internally or externally via Microsoft will own the copyright of any recordings made. If you do not wish to have your image/voice recorded please consider this before attending

Scenarios like recommendation systems are characterized by the presence of agents that play the role of experts by observing how much end-users would be interested in an item. However, their observations are subject to noise. To improve the service offered to end-users, a central agent can collect all the observations and deal with the noise by merging them, before deciding which items to propose to an end-user. This merging gives rise to interdependencies among the experts (who have a value/cost for the items when it is chosen by the end-user), that, in turn, create externalities effects. In this talk, this kind of scenario is analyzed, different types of externalities due to interdependency are described, and possibility and impossibility results in designing efficient, incentive compatible, individually rational, and weakly budget balanced mechanisms are presented. In the case study considered in this presentation, a federated search engine collects ads from a set of advertising providers, and decides which ads to display to a specific end-user.

This talk is part of the Microsoft Research Cambridge, public talks series.

Tell a friend about this talk:

This talk is included in these lists:

Note that ex-directory lists are not shown.


© 2006-2022, University of Cambridge. Contact Us | Help and Documentation | Privacy and Publicity