University of Cambridge > Talks.cam > Microsoft Research Cambridge, public talks > Confining the Ghost in the Machine: Using Types to Secure JavaScript Sandboxing

Confining the Ghost in the Machine: Using Types to Secure JavaScript Sandboxing

Add to your list(s) Download to your calendar using vCal

If you have a question about this talk, please contact Microsoft Research Cambridge Talks Admins.

This event may be recorded and made available internally or externally via http://research.microsoft.com. Microsoft will own the copyright of any recordings made. If you do not wish to have your image/voice recorded please consider this before attending

The commercial Web depends on combining content, especially advertisements, from sites that do not trust one another. Because this content can contain malicious code, several corporations and researchers have designed JavaScript sandboxing techniques (e.g., ADsafe, Caja, and Facebook JavaScript). These sandboxes depend on static restrictions, transformations, and libraries that perform dynamic checks. How can we be sure that they work?

We tackle the problem of proving the security of these sandboxes. Our technique depends on creating specialized types to characterize the properties of the sandboxes, exploiting the structure of the checks contained in the libraries. The resulting checkers work on actual JavaScript code that is effectively unaltered; I will focus on our application to Yahoo!’s ADsafe. We establish soundness using our semantics for JavaScript, which has been tested for conformity against real implementations.

Joint work with Arjun Guha and Joe Politz.

This talk is part of the Microsoft Research Cambridge, public talks series.

Tell a friend about this talk:

This talk is included in these lists:

Note that ex-directory lists are not shown.

 

© 2006-2014 Talks.cam, University of Cambridge. Contact Us | Help and Documentation | Privacy and Publicity