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No interpretation of probability

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Many scientific theories involve probabilities. What would the world have to be like for such a theory to be true? I argue that none of the usual interpretations of probability provides a plausible answer. Instead, I suggest that we should not give probabilistic theories truth-conditional content at all. The aim of such theories is not to register facts about a special probabilistic quantity, but to capture noisy patterns in the world. I also explore some ramifications of this view for our knowledge of probabilities.

This talk is part of the CamPoS (Cambridge Philosophy of Science) seminar series.

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