University of Cambridge > > Departmental Seminars in History and Philosophy of Science > What pluralism could be and might do

What pluralism could be and might do

Add to your list(s) Download to your calendar using vCal

If you have a question about this talk, please contact Helen Curry.

Plenty of philosophers of science now explicitly advocate some form of pluralism. Sometimes this is a methodological pluralism: we should consider lots of different problems, and tackle them using many different approaches and theoretical frameworks. That sounds good. But sometimes this is ontological pluralism: what exists is (somehow) relative to our approaches and frameworks. This is sometimes invoked to debunk various metaphysical projects, which are presumed to have framework-independent ambitions. I have good news and bad news for ontological pluralists with such motivations. The bad news is that ontological pluralism is incoherent. The good news is that there is a coherent form of pluralism that will do just as well at debunking metaphysics.

This talk is part of the Departmental Seminars in History and Philosophy of Science series.

Tell a friend about this talk:

This talk is included in these lists:

Note that ex-directory lists are not shown.


© 2006-2024, University of Cambridge. Contact Us | Help and Documentation | Privacy and Publicity