Science and the approximation account of knowledge

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• Wesley Buckwalter (University of Manchester)
• Thursday 14 November 2019, 15:30-17:00
• Seminar Room 2, Department of History and Philosophy of Science.

If you have a question about this talk, please contact Agnes Bolinska.

It is widely accepted that knowledge is factive, meaning that only truths can be known. This theory creates a sceptical challenge. Because many scientific beliefs are only approximately true, and therefore false, they do not count as knowledge. I consider several responses to this challenge and propose a new one. I propose easing the truth requirement on knowledge to allow approximately true, practically adequate representations to count as knowledge. In addition to addressing the sceptical challenge, this view also coheres with several previous theoretical proposals in epistemology.

This talk is part of the Departmental Seminars in History and Philosophy of Science series.

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