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Secure and efficient networks

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If you have a question about this talk, please contact Kieron Ivy Turk.

This study aims to understand efficient network formation and optimal defensive resource distribution in the presence of an intelligent attacker. We present a two-player dynamic framework in which the Defender and the Attacker compete in a network formation and defence game with heterogeneous vertices’ values. Such a model allows for studying the trade-off between network efficiency and security. Contrary to the literature, we find that a centrally protected star network does not yield the maximum payoff for the defending side in most circumstances, even being the most secure network formation. Additionally, it reveals the new type of network that often arises in an equilibrium of the games with limited defensive resources—a maxi-core network.

This talk is part of the Computer Laboratory Security Seminar series.

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