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Extracting Unknown Keys from Unknown Algorithms Encrypting Unknown Fixed Messages and Returning no Results
If you have a question about this talk, please contact Wei Ming Khoo.
In addition to its usual complexity assumptions, cryptography silently assumes that information can be physically protected in a single location. As we now know, real-life devices are not ideal and confidential information leaks through different physical channels. Whilst most aspects of side channel leakage (cryptophthora) are now well understood, no attacks on totally unknown algorithms are known to date. This paper describes such an attack. By totally unknown we mean that no information on the algorithm’s mathematical description (including the plaintext size), the microprocessor or the chip’s power consumption model is available to the attacker.
This talk is part of the Computer Laboratory Security Seminar series.
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