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Caveat coercitor: towards coercion-evident elections
If you have a question about this talk, please contact Wei Ming Khoo.
It has proved very difficult, and is perhaps impossible, to design an electronic voting system which satisfies the three desired properties of voter-incoercibility, results-verifiability, and usability. Therefore, we have looked at forgoing incoercibility, and replacing it with “coercion evidence”—after an election, it will be possible for observers to see how much coercion has taken place, and therefore whether the results constitute a mandate for the winner. The system we describe is intended to be practical to use.
The talk will include an introduction to the concerns and issues of electronic voting, as well as a brief survey of existing systems. The body of the talk ongoing, unpublished work. I will welcome comments during and after the seminar.
This talk is part of the Computer Laboratory Security Seminar series.
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