University of Cambridge > Talks.cam > Computer Laboratory Security Seminar > SEAL: sealed-bid auction without auctioneers

SEAL: sealed-bid auction without auctioneers

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  • UserFeng Hao, Department of Computer Science, University of Warwick
  • ClockTuesday 28 April 2020, 14:00-15:00
  • HouseWebinar.

If you have a question about this talk, please contact Jack Hughes.

In this talk, I will report our recent work on decentralized e-auction. The paper has been published in IEEE TIFS and is publicly available at https://eprint.iacr.org/2019/1332. In this work, we show how to apply standard zero-knowledge proof primitives, combined with novel engineering techniques, to transform a simple Boolean-OR function to a complex MAX function. This results in decentralized e-auction protocols that are far better than any existing schemes in terms of computation and communication complexity. Our work shows, for the first time, that it is possible to securely and efficiently implement a Vickrey auction without involving any auctioneer, hence clearing a major obstacle of deploying Vickrey auctions in practice.

RECORDING : Please note, this event will be recorded and will be available after the event for an indeterminate period under a CC BY -NC-ND license. Audience members should bear this in mind before joining the webinar or asking questions.

This talk is part of the Computer Laboratory Security Seminar series.

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