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A Least Human-Restrictive GATT Environmental Model at the G-20

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Chaired by Dan Kim

Please join us for the first IPE and Foreign Policy groups event of the Easter term. Dr. Pedro Erik Carneiro will present his recent research. If you would like to be added to the IPE or Foreign Policy Research Group email list, please email Dan Kim at


In the search for leadership, flexibility and strong intangible capital for environmental agreement and recognizing bounded rationality, we investigate binding environmental agreement among the G-20 countries, which could establish principles or safe minimum standards. Firstly, we seek to measure G-20 intangible capital, and find that the government balance and inflation are the most significant factors. Then, we discuss binding environmental agreement in the literature and the importance of the behavioral approach when dealing with such agreement. In the last section, we use Evolutionary Game Theory to observe the main factors relating to a G-20 environmental agreement in which the evolutionary equilibrium has only environmental friendly firms. We argue for the improvement of national governance, the GATT model and the least human-restrictive principle.

This talk is part of the International Political Economy Research Group series.

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