University of Cambridge > > Economics & Policy Seminars, CJBS > MANIPULATIVE CONSUMERS


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We study optimal monopoly pricing with evasive consumers. The seller uses consumer data to finetune pricing. However, such third degree price discrimination encourages data-conscious consumers to manipulate their observable attributes (at a cost). This reduces the effectiveness of information, sometimes rendering it useless. For several settings, we derive the monopolist’s optimal investigation strategy, and find that less is more.

This talk is part of the Economics & Policy Seminars, CJBS series.

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