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Practical reasoning and inference

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One way of capturing the force of practical reasoning, or deliberation, is to think of it as inference (e.g. the practical syllogism). I reject this inferential model, and offer another, under which the force of reasoning is of a rather different sort. The conclusion of a process of deliberation can, on this new model, be an action, and such deliberation can have a structure, but it is not inferential structure.

This talk is part of the Departmental Seminars in History and Philosophy of Science series.

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