University of Cambridge > > HPS Philosophy Workshop > Kripke's Wittgenstein on meaning and rules

Kripke's Wittgenstein on meaning and rules

Add to your list(s) Download to your calendar using vCal

If you have a question about this talk, please contact Vashka dos Remedios.

According to Kripke, the main theme of Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigation is the sceptical paradox about meaning and the sceptical solution to the paradox. Kripke’s interpretation of Wittgenstein has invited lots of criticisms. Especially, commentators are not happy with Kripke’s sceptical solution to the paradox. How can a sceptical solution be a genuine solution? In this paper, I argue that the commentators’ worries are based on the misunderstanding of Kripke. I argue that the nature of Kripke’s solution is falsificationistic, which is analogous to Popper’s falsificationism. And the implication of Kripke’s falsificationism is that Kripke is committed to the transcendental idealism about rules and meaning.

This talk is part of the HPS Philosophy Workshop series.

Tell a friend about this talk:

This talk is included in these lists:

Note that ex-directory lists are not shown.


© 2006-2024, University of Cambridge. Contact Us | Help and Documentation | Privacy and Publicity