What Death Can Tell: Are Executives Paid for Their Contributions to Firm Value?

Add to your list(s) Download to your calendar using vCal

• Dr Bang Dang Nguyen (CJBS & Hong Kong University of Science and Technology)
• Tuesday 22 February 2011, 16:45-17:45
• Winstanley Lecture Hall, Trinity College.

If you have a question about this talk, please contact Rachel Marston.

An efficient managerial labor market should compensate executives according to their contribution to shareholder value. We provide novel empirical evidence about the relationship between executive pay and managerial contribution to value by exploiting the exogenous variation resulting from stock price reactions to sudden deaths. We find, first, that the managerial labor market is characterized by positive sorting: managers with high contributions to value obtain higher pay. We find, second, that executives appear, on average, to retain about 80% of the value they create. Overall, our results are informative about the workings of the managerial labor market.

This talk is part of the Cambridge Finance Workshop Series series.

This talk is included in these lists:

• All Talks (aka the CURE list)
• CERF and CF Events
• Cambridge Finance Workshop Series
• Cambridge Judge Business School
• Interested Talks
• Winstanley Lecture Hall, Trinity College

Note that ex-directory lists are not shown.