University of Cambridge > Talks.cam > Departmental Seminars in History and Philosophy of Science > A problem for determining the structural features of experience: a pessimistic meta-induction

A problem for determining the structural features of experience: a pessimistic meta-induction

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A dominant thought in consciousness studies is that we should investigate consciousness (either wholly, or at least in part) by studying the structural features of consciousness. Structural features of experience are necessary (or invariant) features of experience. Examples include the Kantian claim that all perceptual experiences must be experiences of space and time, and the claim that experience of red are more similar to experiences of blue than they are to experiences of green. Ontic structuralists believe that all there is to consciousness is its structure. Methodological structuralists think that scientific investigation of consciousness can only reveal structural features of consciousness. Many, not committed to either of those claims, nevertheless think that a fruitful approach to understanding consciousness will lie in understanding its structure. In contrast to all of these positions, I argue that we ought to be pessimistic about our ability to determine the structural features of experience – if indeed there are any. The argument takes the form of a pessimistic meta-induction: many claims as to what are structural features of experience have turned out to be false. My diagnosis of why people have made claims about what the structure of experience is – claims that have turned out to be false – is that people are consistently fooled by the limitations of their own sensory imagination and they consistently underestimate the range of sensory experiences they – and other people – have not had. So, in fact, we should not be confident that we can determine the structural features of experience – if indeed there are any.

This talk is part of the Departmental Seminars in History and Philosophy of Science series.

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