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The solution to the problem of mental causation

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For some time it has been thought that non-reductive theories of the mind face a special problem of mental causation and that this problem needs to be solved by constructing metaphysical theories of the relationship between mental and physical entities (for example, theories of the ‘realisation’ relation) or of the relata of causation. In this paper I argue that this problem has a straightforward solution once the dubious assumptions which underlie it are revealed. The solution is neutral between physicalist and ‘emergentist’ views of the mind, and is also neutral between theories of causation.

This talk is part of the Departmental Seminars in History and Philosophy of Science series.

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