University of Cambridge > > CamPoS (Cambridge Philosophy of Science) seminar > Perceptual wronging and perceptual injustice

Perceptual wronging and perceptual injustice

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You can wrong people through how you treat them. You can wrong people through how you think about them. But can you wrong people through how you perceive them? I argue that you can, and that such perceptual wronging underwrites pervasive social injustices. This proposal relies on specific claims about perception and about wrongdoing. Regarding perception, I argue that perceptual content is rich and includes features such as salience, affordances and high-level kinds. Regarding wrongdoing, I argue that even though perceptual processes are relatively automatic, a subject can nevertheless be responsible for how they perceive the world. I then reflect on what this might mean for our understanding of structural injustice.

This talk is part of the CamPoS (Cambridge Philosophy of Science) seminar series.

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