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Pluralism about actual causation

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If you have a question about this talk, please contact Matt Farr.

In this talk I will suggest a pluralism with regard to actual causation: there is not a single and unified concept but a plurality of concepts of actual causation. The motivation for this pluralism is functional. The concepts need to be distinguished because otherwise they do not facilitate some of their key purposes: intervention and the ascription of responsibility. I will also explore some consequences for theories of causal models.

This talk is part of the CamPoS (Cambridge Philosophy of Science) seminar series.

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