'Bischer Nicht Gemeldet’: British Attempts to Assess German Manpower Reserves during the Great War.'

Add to your list(s) Download to your calendar using vCal

• Louis Halewood, University of Oxford
• Friday 12 February 2016, 16:00-18:00
• Seminar Room 3, Alison Richards Building.

If you have a question about this talk, please contact Kate Bruce-Lockhart.

Revisionist historians have advanced our understanding of the strategy of attrition which lay at the heart of the Great War, yet in the middle of the centenary studies of the intelligence behind and assessment of attrition are few. In this paper, I explore British attempts to assess German manpower reserves, and the implications this had for the making of strategy. Understanding the size of the manpower resources of the enemy, and the casualties already inflicted, was crucial to determining what the Entente needed to do to win the war, or whether it even could be won. However, this proved an enormous challenge. British sources were limited and unreliable. Closed sources, namely prisoners of war, provided only a narrow – and potentially anomalous – snapshot of the broader picture. Open sources, including casualty lists published by Germany, were outdated or at worst potentially misinformation.

While it was easier for some, especially senior army officers, to ignore this problem and rely on wishful estimates, as the war dragged on it became clear that the question of German manpower demanded a serious answer. Consequently, the Enemy Personnel Committee (EPC) was established in London in 1916 to tackle the problem. The EPC combined the expertise of soldiers and civil servants, and deployed cutting-edge technology in the form of the Powers tabulating machine. Yet none of this could negate the chief problem: a lack of quality sources. Ultimately, the EPC provided reports shrouded in doubt, which were of little use to British leaders. Into this vacuum stepped Field Marshal Sir Douglas Haig. His own headquarters’ dubious estimates were put forward with confidence in Whitehall, and without any real alternative Prime Minister David Lloyd George listened, and launched the Passchendaele offensive in 1917. Confidence had supplanted facts; this was not a rational way to formulate strategy.

This talk is part of the Violence and Conflict Graduate Workshop, Faculty of History series.

This talk is included in these lists:

• Seminar Room 3, Alison Richards Building
• Violence and Conflict Graduate Workshop, Faculty of History

Note that ex-directory lists are not shown.