University of Cambridge > Talks.cam > Department of Psychiatry & CPFT Thursday Lunchtime Seminar Series > Delusions and Three Myths of Irrational Belief

Delusions and Three Myths of Irrational Belief

Add to your list(s) Download to your calendar using vCal

If you have a question about this talk, please contact Nicholas Morgan.

Professor Bortolotti writes:

My paper addresses the contribution that the delusion literature has made to the philosophy of belief. Three conclusions will be drawn: (1) a belief does not need to be epistemically rational to be used in the interpretation of behaviour; (2) a belief does not need to be epistemically rational to have significant psychological or epistemic benefits; (3) beliefs exhibiting the features of epistemic irrationality exemplified by delusions are not infrequent, and they are not an exception in a largely rational belief system. What we learn from the delusion literature is that there are complex relationships between rationality and interpretation, rationality and success, and rationality and knowledge.

This talk is part of the Department of Psychiatry & CPFT Thursday Lunchtime Seminar Series series.

Tell a friend about this talk:

This talk is included in these lists:

Note that ex-directory lists are not shown.

 

© 2006-2018 Talks.cam, University of Cambridge. Contact Us | Help and Documentation | Privacy and Publicity