Understanding counterfactuals

Add to your list(s) Download to your calendar using vCal

• Gunnar Björnsson (Göteborg University)
• Friday 11 May 2007, 12:00-13:30
• Seminar Room 1, Department of History and Philosophy of Science.

If you have a question about this talk, please contact Peter.Lipton.

Standard theories of counterfactual conditionals are not only extensionally inadequate, but fail to make intelligible why the proposed truth-conditions would attach to natural language conditionals or counterfactual thought in science, philosophy, or everyday life. This talk will explain how a naturalistic contextualist account of conditionals can remedy these problems by tying the truth- conditions of counterfactuals to the cognitive function of natural inferential mechanisms.

This talk is part of the Department of History and Philosophy of Science series.

This talk is included in these lists:

• All Talks (aka the CURE list)
• Cambridge talks
• Department of History and Philosophy of Science
• Featured lists
• History and Philosophy of Science long list
• Philosophy Events
• Philosophy and History of Science
• Seminar Room 1, Department of History and Philosophy of Science
• Trust & Technology Initiative - interesting events
• hc446
• jer64's list

Note that ex-directory lists are not shown.