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Understanding counterfactuals

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If you have a question about this talk, please contact Peter.Lipton.

Standard theories of counterfactual conditionals are not only extensionally inadequate, but fail to make intelligible why the proposed truth-conditions would attach to natural language conditionals or counterfactual thought in science, philosophy, or everyday life. This talk will explain how a naturalistic contextualist account of conditionals can remedy these problems by tying the truth- conditions of counterfactuals to the cognitive function of natural inferential mechanisms.

This talk is part of the Department of History and Philosophy of Science series.

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