University of Cambridge > Talks.cam > Operations Group Seminar Series > Emergency Department Reimbursement -- An application of yardstick competition for service systems

Emergency Department Reimbursement -- An application of yardstick competition for service systems

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Yardstick competition is a regulatory scheme for local monopolists (e.g., hospitals), where the monopolists’ reimbursement is linked to its performance relative to other monopolists. This regulatory scheme is known to work well in providing cost-reduction incentives and offers the theoretical underpinnings behind the hospital DRG -based reimbursement system used throughout the world. This work investigates how yardstick competition performs in service systems (e.g., hospital emergency departments), where in addition to reducing cost the regulator’s goal is to reduce waiting times. We show that the usual form of yardstick competition creates too long waiting times by failing to incentivise sufficient capacity investment, and discuss how it can be appropriately modified to achieve this goal. This is joint work with Tolga Tezcan and Ozlem Yildiz.

This talk is part of the Operations Group Seminar Series series.

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