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SUMMARY:Efficient advert assignment - Frank Kelly (Statslab)
DTSTART:20150427T153000Z
DTEND:20150427T161000Z
UID:TALK59295@talks.cam.ac.uk
CONTACT:Eoin Devane
DESCRIPTION:This talk will describe some recent joint work with Peter Key 
 (Microsoft Research) and Neil Walton (University of Amsterdam).\n\nAd-auct
 ions are real-time algorithms that determine the adverts shown\,\nfor exam
 ple\, on a Google search. In current Ad-auctions there is an information a
 symmetry between the platform and advertisers: the platform typically know
 s more than an advertiser about the search being conducted\, such as infor
 mation about the searcher. Hence the platform can potentially choose price
 s and an allocation that depends on the platform's additional information.
  In contrast\, the advertiser has to rely on more coarse-grained informati
 on\, perhaps just the search terms of a query together with a crude catego
 rization of the searcher.\n\n\nThe talk will describe how the information 
 asymmetry can be used to develop a simple mechanism for advert assignment 
 and pricing that incentivizes truthful bidding and encourages convergence 
 to a unique Nash equilibrium that is socially optimal.
LOCATION:MR2\, CMS
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