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SUMMARY:Hidden Markets: Designing Efficient but Simple Electronic Markets 
 - Sven Sueken\, Harvard University
DTSTART:20110321T110000Z
DTEND:20110321T120000Z
UID:TALK30327@talks.cam.ac.uk
CONTACT:Microsoft Research Cambridge Talks Admins
DESCRIPTION:The Internet has allowed electronic markets like eBay or Amazo
 n to become ubiquitous. However\, new technologies are continuously enabli
 ng new kinds of markets\, often in domains where users might find monetary
  transactions unnatural or where they might not expect a market at all.\nW
 hile these new markets can increase efficiency\, they are also often unnat
 ural or complex such that individuals may not have an easy time interactin
 g with them. In this talk\, I will describe my research agenda on "Hidden 
 Market Design\," a new paradigm with the goal to design efficient but simp
 le markets by hiding the market's complexities from its users.\n\nTo illus
 trate this idea\, I present a detailed case study on the design and analys
 is of a hidden peer-to-peer backup market. I designed and implemented this
  market in concert with a user interface (UI) that hides the underlying co
 mplexities\, while maintaining the market's functionality. Using a live de
 mo of the actual system\, I illustrate the important connection between UI
  design and market design. The main theoretical result is an equilibrium e
 xistence and uniqueness theorem\, which also holds if a certain percentage
  of the user population is unresponsive to prices. In closing\, I will bri
 efly present an overview of three of my other market design projects on se
 lfishness and altruism in P2P networks\, on work accounting mechanisms\, a
 nd on market user interface design.
LOCATION:Small lecture theatre\, Microsoft Research Ltd\, 7 J J Thomson Av
 enue (Off Madingley Road)\, Cambridge
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