One of the predominate conceptions of discrimination in law and social science defines it causally. Something is discrimination on th e basis of\, e.g.\, race or sex only if the outcome would not have occurre d had the person been\, or been perceived to be\, a different racial or se x category. This counterfactual definition has been embraced by the United States Supreme Court in interpreting federal anti-discrimination statutes and the Equal Protection Clause\, and it structures much of the methodolo gical work of social scientists\, causal inference researchers\, and compu ter scientists who design studies and make policy-relevant empirical claim s.
But this definition is indeterminate and it suppresses assumption s that must ground any definition of discrimination. Using examples from l aw and social science\, I show how the causal definition does not yield de terminate designations of discrimination so much as it expresses the analy st's prior sociological and normative commitments.
I close by arguin g that any account of discrimination must confront two foundational questi ons. The first is sociological: What is the category on the basis of w hich the conduct is said to be discriminatory? The second is normativ e: What constitutes fair or just treatment in light of the nature of t hat category? Disagreement over these questions is currently obscured by conclusory doctrinal labels or methodological terms. Because any defin ition of discrimination inevitably embeds answers to these questions\, tho se answers must be made explicit.
LOCATION:Hopkinson Lecture Theatre\, New Museums Site END:VEVENT END:VCALENDAR