The value-laden nature of scientific information suggests t hat when such information influences democratic decision making\, the embe dded social values do as well. This creates a problem when deploying scien ce within decision making in a democracy: the people or their representati ves should determine which values guide decision making\, not scientists. Value laden scientific information can therefore undermine the legitimacy of democratic decisions. Philosophers of science have only recently begun to take this problem of legitimacy seriously.
This talk will explore this emerging area of 'political philosophy of science' with a particular focus on the political legitimacy of value-laden scientific information w ithin decision making. I will present the inaptly named 'democratic alignm ent view' and attempt to defend it against recent challenges. These challe nges claim that the view does a poor job of accommodating value-plurality and would further marginalise minority views. I argue that the democratic alignment view has the resources to meet these challenges\, and there are significant benefits to retaining it.
LOCATION:Arts School Lecture Theatre A\, New Museums Site END:VEVENT END:VCALENDAR