BEGIN:VCALENDAR
VERSION:2.0
PRODID:-//Talks.cam//talks.cam.ac.uk//
X-WR-CALNAME:Talks.cam
BEGIN:VEVENT
SUMMARY:Moral Knowledge\, Moral Sensitivity and Moral Education - Dr Roger
  Marples\, Principal Lecturer
DTSTART:20100316T173000Z
DTEND:20100316T193000Z
UID:TALK23287@talks.cam.ac.uk
CONTACT:Ewa Illakowicz
DESCRIPTION:The aims of this paper are twofold: firstly\, to demonstrate t
 he possibility of knowledge in the moral domain\, and secondly to specify 
 the ‘objects’ of such knowledge.  Moral non-cognitivism is seriously f
 lawed in its account of truth in relation to moral judgments\, in its reje
 ction of the possibility of moral facts as well as in its reliance on a nu
 mber of questionable distinctions such as that between fact and value and 
 descriptive and evaluative discourse. It operates with an excessively narr
 ow\, and all too frequently absolutist conception of reality\, the result 
 of which is a misplaced skepticism.\n\nThe nature of moral facts is explic
 ated by reference to moral properties and moral requirements.  Such facts\
 , though non-inferential\, may be said to be directly observable by those 
 in possession of a distinct sensibility and conceptual vocabulary upon whi
 ch the recognition and significance of morally salient features depends.\n
 \nUnderpinning the argument for moral knowledge is a form of non-naturalis
 tic moral realism whereby moral knowledge may be said to be arrived at in 
 ways very different from\, but equally valid as those yielding scientific 
 knowledge.  The utility\, as well as the limitations\, of the analogy betw
 een secondary qualities and the mind-dependency of moral properties will d
 emonstrate how moral properties may be said to possess a dispositional cha
 racter\, in those with the requisite sensibility\, towards feeling and act
 ion even if such a disposition is not accountable in purely mechanistic te
 rms.  The skills associated with the discovery of moral facts are identifi
 able as requiring a sensitivity to context without recourse to any mysteri
 ous faculty associated with intuitionism.  Any such discovery has both a c
 ognitive and affective dimension\, the latter having all too frequently be
 en ignored in discussions of moral knowledge.  The respects in which this 
 is crucial to identifying features in the world possessing moral salience 
 merits particular scrutiny in view of the fact that morality’s concern i
 s not only with belief\, but also with action\, feeling\, qualities of cha
 racter and lives that may be lived with  integrity.  Moral knowledge canno
 t therefore be reduced to something merely propositional.  Internal moral 
 realism provides a clear link between morality and reasons for action\, wi
 th the so-called belief-desire theory of moral motivation  relying on noth
 ing more than Humean dogma.\n\nIn so far as the focus of our moral vision 
 is on specific contexts\, with their own unique features\, moral epistemol
 ogy is concerned with the truth of particular judgments as opposed to the 
 search for rules or principles.  If the latter exist\, they are shown to b
 e both pro tanto and uncodifiable.  The significance of this for moral edu
 cation is noted.\n\nMoral claims may be said to possess objective status i
 n virtue of the fact that moral properties are objective features of the w
 orld\, in spite of attempts by non-cognitivists such as Mackie to portray 
 them as inescapably queer.  The defence of moral objectivity will rely on 
 the denial of Williams’ unwarranted assumption that all knowledge requir
 es explanation without reference to parochial concepts such as the ‘thic
 k’ moral concepts on which moral discourse relies.  Their dependence on 
 the existence of social realms of meaning does nothing to damage the possi
 bility of objective moral judgment.  The so-called threat to moral objecti
 vity posed by the existence of widely differing cultural viewpoints and mo
 ral disagreement is shown to be exaggerated.  The truth in relativism is a
 ddressed\, and the fact that there may well be a measure of relativity in 
 moral judgment fails to undermine the possibility of rational adjudication
  between competing viewpoints\; it merely serves to demonstrate the unavoi
 dability of pluralism within the moral sphere\, whereby moral agents may w
 ell justifiably differ in their ascription of different emphases to values
  such as justice on the one hand and compassion on the other\, as witnesse
 d in the recent dispute concerning the release of Abdelbaset Ali al-Megrah
 i \n\n\nRoger Marples\nRoehampton University\, London\n
LOCATION: Faculty of Education\, 184 Hills Road\, Cambridge\, CB2 8PQ\, GS
 1
END:VEVENT
END:VCALENDAR