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CATEGORIES:Cambridge Finance Workshop Series
SUMMARY:Trading and shareholder democracy - Speaker to be 
 confirmed
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20200430T130000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20200430T140000
UID:TALK141406AThttp://talks.cam.ac.uk
URL:http://talks.cam.ac.uk/talk/index/141406
DESCRIPTION:We study shareholder voting in a model in which tr
 ading affects the composition of the shareholder b
 ase. Trading and voting are complementary\, which 
 gives rise to self-fulfilling expectations about p
 roposal acceptance and multiple equilibria. Increa
 sing liquidity may reduce prices and welfare\, bec
 ause it allows extreme shareholders to gain more w
 eight in voting. Prices and welfare can move in op
 posite directions\, so the former are an invalid p
 roxy for the latter. Delegating decision-making to
  the board can improve shareholder value. However\
 , the optimal board is biased\, does not represent
  current shareholders\, and may not garner support
  from the majority of shareholders.
LOCATION: Webinar  (via Zoom online)- link to follow
CONTACT:CERF/CF Admin
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