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SUMMARY:Weakest-link control of invasive species: Impacts of memory\, boun
 ded rationality and network structure in repeated cooperative games - Adam
  Kleczkowski (University of Strathclyde)
DTSTART:20190704T140000Z
DTEND:20190704T143000Z
UID:TALK126829@talks.cam.ac.uk
CONTACT:INI IT
DESCRIPTION:The nature of dispersal of many invasive pests and pathogens i
 n agricultural and forestry makes it necessary to consider how the actions
  of one manager affect neighbouring properties. In addition to the direct 
 effects of a potential spread of a pest and the resulting economic loss\, 
 there are also indirect consequences that affect whole regions and that re
 quire coordinated actions to manage and/or to eradicate it (like movement 
 restrictions). In this talk we address the emergence and stability of coop
 eration among agents who respond to a threat of an invasive pest or diseas
 e. The model\, based on the weakest-link paradigm\, uses repeated multi-pa
 rticipant coordination games where players&rsquo\; pay-offs depend on mana
 gement decisions to prevent the invasion on their own land as well as of t
 heir neighbours on a network. We show that for the basic cooperation game 
 agents select the risk-dominant strategy of a Stag hunt game over the pay-
 off dominant strategy of implementing control measures. However\, cooperat
 ion can be achieved by the social planner offering a biosecurity payment. 
 The critical level of this payment depends on the details of the decision-
 making process\, with higher trust (based on reputation of other agents re
 flecting their past performance) allowing significant reduction in necessa
 ry payments and slowing down decay in cooperation when the payment is low.
  We also find that allowing for uncertainty in decision-making process can
  enhance cooperation for low levels of payments. Finally\, we show the imp
 ortance of industry structure to the emergence of cooperation\, with incre
 ase in the average coordination number of network nodes leading to increas
 e in the critical biosecurity payment.
LOCATION:Seminar Room 1\, Newton Institute
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