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CATEGORIES:Isaac Newton Institute Seminar Series
SUMMARY:Weakest-link control of invasive species: Impacts 
 of memory\, bounded rationality and network struct
 ure in repeated cooperative games - Adam Kleczkows
 ki (University of Strathclyde)
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20190704T150000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20190704T153000
UID:TALK126829AThttp://talks.cam.ac.uk
URL:http://talks.cam.ac.uk/talk/index/126829
DESCRIPTION:The nature of dispersal of many invasive pests and
  pathogens in agricultural and forestry makes it n
 ecessary to consider how the actions of one manage
 r affect neighbouring properties. In addition to t
 he direct effects of a potential spread of a pest 
 and the resulting economic loss\, there are also i
 ndirect consequences that affect whole regions and
  that require coordinated actions to manage and/or
  to eradicate it (like movement restrictions). In 
 this talk we address the emergence and stability o
 f cooperation among agents who respond to a threat
  of an invasive pest or disease. The model\, based
  on the weakest-link paradigm\, uses repeated mult
 i-participant coordination games where players&rsq
 uo\; pay-offs depend on management decisions to pr
 event the invasion on their own land as well as of
  their neighbours on a network. We show that for t
 he basic cooperation game agents select the risk-d
 ominant strategy of a Stag hunt game over the pay-
 off dominant strategy of implementing control meas
 ures. However\, cooperation can be achieved by the
  social planner offering a biosecurity payment. Th
 e critical level of this payment depends on the de
 tails of the decision-making process\, with higher
  trust (based on reputation of other agents reflec
 ting their past performance) allowing significant 
 reduction in necessary payments and slowing down d
 ecay in cooperation when the payment is low. We al
 so find that allowing for uncertainty in decision-
 making process can enhance cooperation for low lev
 els of payments. Finally\, we show the importance 
 of industry structure to the emergence of cooperat
 ion\, with increase in the average coordination nu
 mber of network nodes leading to increase in the c
 ritical biosecurity payment.
LOCATION:Seminar Room 1\, Newton Institute
CONTACT:INI IT
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