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CATEGORIES:CamPoS (Cambridge Philosophy of Science) seminar
SUMMARY:Temporal binding and the idea of a 'sense of agenc
 y': a critical examination - Christoph Hoerl (Univ
 ersity of Warwick)
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20181107T130000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20181107T143000
UID:TALK111175AThttp://talks.cam.ac.uk
URL:http://talks.cam.ac.uk/talk/index/111175
DESCRIPTION:Voluntary action gives rise to a temporal binding 
 effect\, in which the interval between intentional
  movements and their causal consequences is subjec
 tively compressed. In the current psychological li
 terature\, temporal binding is widely conceived of
  as a measure of a 'sense of agency' involved in v
 oluntary action. I provide an analysis of the expl
 anatory framework that I take to be in play in exi
 sting accounts based on this idea. I raise two key
  problems for such accounts – an empirical and a c
 onceptual one – and argue that the very idea of a 
 dedicated 'sense of agency' rests on a confusion b
 etween two different issues. I then outline an alt
 ernative explanatory framework\, which instead con
 strues temporal binding as a measure of a belief i
 n causality. I show how such an alternative framew
 ork\, too\, can explain the results of studies in 
 which temporal binding has been shown to be affect
 ed by factors that specifically impinge on partici
 pants' judgements about the extent to which they a
 re themselves actively involved in bringing about 
 the timed events.
LOCATION:Seminar Room 2\, Department of History and Philoso
 phy of Science
CONTACT:Matt Farr
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