University of Cambridge > > CamPoS (Cambridge Philosophy of Science) seminar > From authenticism to alethism: against McCarroll on observer memory

From authenticism to alethism: against McCarroll on observer memory

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  • UserKourken Michaelian (UniversitĂ© Grenoble Alpes)
  • ClockWednesday 24 February 2021, 13:00-14:30
  • HouseZoom.

If you have a question about this talk, please contact Matt Farr.

In opposition to the natural view that observer perspective memory is bound to be inauthentic, McCarroll (2018) argues for the surprising conclusion that memories in which the subject sees himself in the remembered scene are, in many cases, true to the subject’s original experience of the scene. By means of a careful reconstruction of his argument, this paper shows that McCarroll does not succeed in establishing his conclusion. It shows, in fact, that we ought to come to the opposed conclusion that, while it may be possible in principle for observer perspective memory to be authentic, this is unlikely ever to happen in practice. The natural view, in short, is more or less right.

This talk is part of the CamPoS (Cambridge Philosophy of Science) seminar series.

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