COOKIES: By using this website you agree that we can place Google Analytics Cookies on your device for performance monitoring. |
University of Cambridge > Talks.cam > Isaac Newton Institute Seminar Series > Competition among Renewables
Competition among RenewablesAdd to your list(s) Download to your calendar using vCal
If you have a question about this talk, please contact INI IT. MESW02 - Electricity systems of the future: incentives, regulation and analysis for efficient investment We model strategic behavior of renewable suppliers when competing in electricity auctions. We introduce renewables' intermittency by assuming that firms' available capacities are random and private information. In equilibrium, bid functions are a smooth decreasing function of firms' realized capacities. Thus, at times when there is more renewables' availability, supply functions shift outwards and downwards, leading to reductions in the market price. An increase in correlation between firms' available capacities strengthens competition non-monotonically. Keywords: electricity, competition, auctions.Natalia Fabra and Gerard Llobet (CEMFi) This talk is part of the Isaac Newton Institute Seminar Series series. This talk is included in these lists:
Note that ex-directory lists are not shown. |
Other listsHistory and Economics Seminar Cambridge Institute Genomics Core Engineering - Mechanics and Materials Seminar SeriesOther talksBSU Seminar: “Building Representative Matched Samples with Multi-valued Treatments in Large Observational Studies” Sentiment, housing price and consumption Critical Geopolitics of the Polar Regions: An Inter-American Perspective Analytic results for two-loop five-particle amplitudes How to destroy a book The AKT inhibitor Capivasertib (AZD5363): From Discovery to Clinical Proof of Concept |