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CATEGORIES:Stone Lectures
SUMMARY:Sir Richard Stone Annual Lecture: The Emergence of
  Weak\, Despotic and Inclusive States - Professor 
 James Robinson\, University of Chicago
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20180503T170000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20180503T183000
UID:TALK80251AThttp://talks.cam.ac.uk
URL:http://talks.cam.ac.uk/talk/index/80251
DESCRIPTION:Societies under similar geographic and economic co
 nditions and subject to similar external influence
 s nonetheless develop very different types of stat
 es. At one extreme are weak states with little cap
 acity and ability to regulate economic or social r
 elations. At the other are despotic states which d
 ominate civil society. Yet there are others which 
 are locked into an ongoing competition with civil 
 society and it is these\, not the despotic ones\, 
 that develop the greatest capacity. We develop a d
 ynamic contest model of the potential competition 
 between state (controlled by a ruler or a group of
  elites) and civil society (representing non-elite
  citizens)\, where both players can invest to incr
 ease their power. The model leads to different typ
 es of steady states depending on initial condition
 s. One type of steady state\, corresponding to a w
 eak state\, emerges when civil society is strong r
 elative to the state (e.g.\, having developed soci
 al norms limiting political hierarchy). Another ty
 pe of steady state\, corresponding to a despotic s
 tate\, originates from initial conditions where th
 e state is powerful and civil society is weak. A t
 hird type of steady state\, which we refer to as a
 n inclusive state\, emerges when state and civil s
 ociety are more evenly matched. In this case\, eac
 h party has greater incentives to invest to keep u
 p with the other\, and this leads to the most powe
 rful and capable type of state\, while simultaneou
 sly incentivizing civil society to be equally powe
 rful as well. Our framework highlights that compar
 ative statics with respect to structural factors s
 uch as geography\, economic conditions or external
  threats\, are conditional — in the sense that dep
 ending on initial conditions they can shift a soci
 ety into or out of the basin of attraction of the 
 inclusive state.
LOCATION:LG18\, Law Faculty
CONTACT:Dawn Bradley
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