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CATEGORIES:Finance &amp\; Accounting Seminar Series
SUMMARY: “Can Institutional Investors Improve Corporate Go
 vernance Through Collective Action?” - Professor A
 lexander Dyck\,  Professor of Finance and Business
  Economics and ICPM Professor in Pension Managemen
 t\, University of Toronto
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20151027T103000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20151027T120000
UID:TALK62118AThttp://talks.cam.ac.uk
URL:http://talks.cam.ac.uk/talk/index/62118
DESCRIPTION:Can institutional investors generate sufficient po
 wer through collective action to drive improvement
 s in governance? We use proprietary data on the pr
 ivate communications of a formal coalition of Cana
 dian institutional investors and find that its pri
 vate engagements influenced firms’ adoption of maj
 ority voting and say-on-pay advisory votes\, impro
 ved compensation structure and disclosure\, and in
 fluenced CEO incentive intensity. Spillovers to no
 n-engaged firms occur through board interlocks and
  to firms in which the CCGG is expected to be more
  powerful in a voting contest. This form of activi
 sm is both a substitute and complement to other in
 terventions to address governance concerns.
LOCATION:Cambidge Judge Business School\,  W2.01
CONTACT:Crystal
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