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CATEGORIES:Computer Laboratory Security Seminar
SUMMARY:Protecting Programs During Resource Retrieval - Pr
 ofessor Trent Jaeger\, CSE Department\, Pennsylvan
 ia State University
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20140429T150000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20140429T160000
UID:TALK51898AThttp://talks.cam.ac.uk
URL:http://talks.cam.ac.uk/talk/index/51898
DESCRIPTION:*Abstract:*\nPrograms must retrieve many system re
 sources to execute properly\, but\nthere are sever
 al classes of vulnerabilities that may befall prog
 rams\nduring resource retrieval.  These vulnerabil
 ities are difficult for\nprogrammers to eliminate 
 because their cause is external to the\nprogram: a
 dversaries may control the inputs used to build na
 mes\,\nnamespaces used to find the target resource
 s\, and the target resources\nthemselves to trick 
 victim programs to retrieve resources of the\nadve
 rsaries' choosing.  In this talk\, I will present 
 a system\nmechanism\, called the Process Firewall\
 , that protects programs from\nvulnerabilities dur
 ing resource retrieval by introspecting into	\nrun
 ning programs to enforce context-specific rules.  
 Our key insight\nis that using introspection to pr
 event such vulnerabilities is safe\nbecause we onl
 y aim to protect processes\, relying on access con
 trol to\nconfine malicious processes.  I will show
  that the Process Firewall\ncan prevent many types
  of vulnerabilities during resource retrieval\,\ni
 ncluding those involving race conditions.  I will 
 also show how to\nperform such introspection and e
 nforcement efficiently\, incurring much\nlower ove
 rhead than equivalent program defenses.  Finally\,
  I will\ndescribe a conceptual model that describe
 s the conditions for safe\nresource retrieval\, an
 d outline how to produce enforceable rules from\nt
 hat model.  By following this model\, we find that
  the Process\nFirewall mechanism can prevent many 
 vulnerabilities during resource\nretrieval without
  causing false	positives.\n\n*Bio:*\nTrent Jaeger 
 is a Professor in the Computer Science and Enginee
 ring\nDepartment at The Pennsylvania State Univers
 ity and the Co-Director of\nthe Systems and Intern
 et Infrastructure Security Lab.  Trent's\nresearch
  interests include systems security and the applic
 ation of\nprogramming language techniques to impro
 ve security.  He has published\nover 100 referreed
  papers on these topics and the book "Operating\nS
 ystems Security\," which examines the principles b
 ehind secure\noperating systems designs.  Trent ha
 s made a variety of contributions\nto open source 
 systems security\, particularly to the Linux Secur
 ity\nModules framework\, SELinux\, integrity measu
 rement in Linux\, and the\nXen security architectu
 re.  He is currently the Chair of the ACM\nSpecial
  Interest Group on Security\, Audit\, and Control 
 (SIGSAC) and\nProgram Chair of ASIACCS 2014.  Tren
 t has an M.S. and a Ph.D. from the\nUniversity of 
 Michigan\, Ann Arbor in Computer Science and Engin
 eering\nin 1993 and 1997\, respectively\, and spen
 t nine years at IBM Research\nprior to joining Pen
 n State.\n\n\n
LOCATION:Lecture Theatre 2\, Computer Laboratory\, William 
 Gates Building
CONTACT:Laurent Simon
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